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SYMPOSIUM: GLOBAL PERSPEC
TIVES ON NATIONAL SECURITY
FOREWORD: NATIONAL SECURITY’S
DISTORTION EFFECTS
STEPHEN I. VLADECK*
In retrospect, we should hardly be surprised that “national se
curity” concerns have become so pervasive across such a wide and
diverse range of legal fields over the past decade. As our social,
political, and legal cultures have evolved in response to one of the
most traumatic attacks on the United States in its history, it is only
natural that the government’s interest in defending the nation—
and, specifically, in preventing another act of terrorism even ap
proaching the scale of September 11—has played such a ubiquitous
role in so many seemingly unrelated legal disciplines.
To be sure, there are the obvious cases where the national se
curity implications are inescapable, such as lawsuits arising out of
the detention of noncitizens at Guantanamo Bay,1 or challenges to
military commissions,2 or even the civilian criminal prosecutions of
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. My
thanks to Sudha Setty, Sara Fawk, and the editors of the Western New England Law
Review for inviting me to provide this foreword.
1. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding that the
Suspension Clause “has full effect” at Guantanamo). For an excellent recent survey of
the post-Boumediene litigation, see Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene,
and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 653 (2006) (holding that military
commissions established by President Bush were unlawful because they were inconsis
tent with the authority that Congress had provided).
285
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high-profile terrorism suspects like Zacarias Moussaoui,3 Jose Pa
dilla,4 Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri,5 Richard Reid,6 and Ahmed
Omar Abu Ali.7 But even (if not especially) in less obvious cases,
examples abound of national security concerns precipitating an ex
pansion or alteration of established precedent: The Second Circuit
has held that the Supreme Court’s “special needs” doctrine, ordina
rily invoked to justify mass, suspicionless searches wholly unrelated
to law enforcement,8 authorizes random searches of anyone travel
ing on the New York City subway system9—perhaps a surprising
extension of precedent until one considers its temporal proximity to
the subway bombings in Madrid and London (not to mention the
more recent episodes in Moscow).10 The same court has also up
held the government’s power to detain terrorism suspects as “mate
rial witnesses” even in investigations in which no one has been
indicted11 and for a length of time that would probably have been
far more difficult to defend on September 10, 2001.12
3. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 4180844 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 20, 2007) (denying Padilla and his codefendants’ post-trial motion for judg
ment of acquittal); United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 4180847 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 20, 2007) (denying the defendants’ motion for a new trial). Padilla’s appeal to
the Eleventh Circuit remains pending as of this writing.
5. See, e.g., al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.) (vacating the en
banc Fourth Circuit’s rejection of al-Marri’s challenge to his military detention in light
of his indictment in civilian criminal court and his transfer to civilian custody), vacating
al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Mass. 2002).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009). For more on Abu Ali as a microcosm for the broader debate
over trying terrorism suspects in the Article III courts, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Terror
ism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali, 88 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
8. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-25 (2004); Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44
(2000); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Mich. Dep’t of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620
(1989).
9. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 269-71, 275 (2d Cir. 2006).
10. See, e.g., Clifford J. Levy, Female Suicide Bombers Strike at Moscow Subway,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A1 (describing the March 29 terrorist attacks in Moscow).
As the Second Circuit noted in MacWade, the New York policy was directly motivated
by the London attacks. See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 264.
11. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
12. The Ninth Circuit has recently taken serious issue with the government’s postSeptember 11 understanding (and application) of the material-witness statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3144, upholding a damages claim (and denying qualified immunity to former Attor
ney General Ashcroft) arising out of one particularly egregious case. See al-Kidd v.
Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 973 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc denied, 598 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir.
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The Federal Circuit—yes, even it gets terrorism cases—has
held that the political-question doctrine bars a takings claim for
damages arising out of the United States’s 1998 destruction of a
Sudanese pharmaceutical plant in retaliation for the terrorist at
tacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.13 In its view, once
the President determines that a particular facility is “enemy prop
erty,” there is nothing more for the courts to do.14 The politicalquestion doctrine has also been invoked by the Eleventh Circuit in
affirming the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by the wife of a service
member alleging that her husband’s critical injuries in a traffic acci
dent in Iraq were caused by the negligence of a military
contractor.15
In another round of cases, the Third Circuit concluded that the
government may categorically close to the public and the press re
moval proceedings in immigration cases in which the Attorney
General merely asserts a “special interest” in national security.16 In
a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit has held that the so-called statesecrets privilege categorically bars a civil suit by a German citizen
of Lebanese descent who was subjected to “extraordinary rendi
tion,”17 even though all parties now concede most of the material
2010). I leave for another day the thorny question of whether al-Kidd and Awadallah
are inconsistent with each other.
13. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1364-67 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
14. Id. at 1363-65; see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 559 F.3d
578, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reaching same result in separate suit brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 330 F. App’x 200 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
15. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1281-83
(11th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2009) (No. 09
683). But see Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 568 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a suit
against a contractor by its employees arising out of insurgent attacks in Iraq was not
necessarily barred by the political-question doctrine). On March 8, 2010, the Supreme
Court called for the views of the Solicitor General as to whether the certiorari petition
in Carmichael should be granted. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 78
U.S.L.W. 3521 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (mem.) (No. 09-683). As of this writing, the govern
ment has not yet replied.
16. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219-20 (3d Cir.
2002). But see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding
that the categorical closure of such hearings violated the First Amendment).
17. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311-13 (4th Cir. 2007). Similar
claims brought by others subjected to extraordinary rendition have been dismissed on
the ground that courts should not infer a Bivens remedy in such cases because of the
unique national security concerns they raise. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574-77
(2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2010)
(No. 09-923). For a critique of this understanding of Bivens, see Stephen I. Vladeck,
National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010).
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facts, including that it was a case of mistaken identity.18 And the
circuit-level Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review—a
court that had not published a single opinion in its twenty-three
year existence as of September 11—has become the first court for
mally to recognize a “foreign intelligence surveillance” exception to
the Fourth Amendment,19 a question the Supreme Court expressly
reserved in the 1970s.20
There are countless other examples, but I suspect that the
point has been made: For better or worse, one can find national
security considerations influencing ordinary judicial decision mak
ing across almost the entire gamut of contemporary civil and crimi
nal litigation. And while one may well question the merits of each
(and perhaps all) of these decisions, as a body they bespeak a larger
“distortion effect”—where extant doctrine evolves (or devolves) to
accommodate national security considerations for which prior case
law may not adequately have provided. Indeed, the larger and
more important question to me seems not to be whether this distor
tion effect has in fact occurred; the cases cited above, among count
less others, provide thorough proof of this proposition. Rather, the
real query going forward is whether the result has been a body of
national security-specific doctrine in which exceptional rules are ap
plied in exceptional cases (and the lines between the exceptional
and the norm are carefully policed), or whether the exceptions have
in fact become the rules—whether the stress to recognize excep
tions in extraordinary cases has led to the normalization of these
exceptions in all cases.21 As just one example, should we have a
special “national security court” to handle cases raising unique se
crecy concerns, or should we find ways to amend the current evi

18. See, e.g., Ingrid Detter Frankopan, Extraordinary Rendition and the Law of
War, N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 657, 682 (2008); J. Troy Lavers, Extraordinary Ren
dition and the Self Defense Justification: Time to Face the Music, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
385, 407-08 (2007); Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary
Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1337-38 & n.16 (2007);
Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege,
75 BROOK. L. REV. 201, 214-15 (2009).
19. See In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1010-12 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
20. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972).
21. For a broader suggestion that such a normalization of emergency may be in
evitable in the modern state, see Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. SOC.
455 (1941).
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dentiary framework in the civilian courts to accommodate those
concerns?22
To be fair, the scholarship that follows in this symposium issue
of the Western New England Law Review was not specifically ad
dressed to this question. And yet, in each of these four distinct and
thought-provoking pieces, we see at least some signs of the (troub
ling) answer. Moreover, as I briefly explain in the short observa
tions that follow, the authors have each put their fingers not just on
an important legal question with national security implications but,
more specifically, on issues that are currently (or likely soon to
come) before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Aloke Chakravarty’s article is perhaps the best place to start,
all the more so since he brings to bear his perspective and experi
ence as a federal prosecutor.23 In that respect, it is telling that his
focus is not on the criminalization of terrorism but rather on the
need to promote greater humanitarian efforts in conflict-torn (and
terrorist-prone) regions as a means of obviating some of the socio
economic conditions that allow terrorist groups to thrive in the first
place. As he explains, “[t]he stabilization and concomitant empow
erment of governments where terrorist groups thrive is essential to
promote the rule of law and to compete with the ideological drivers
that sustain the terrorists.”24 Thus, his article proposes to supple
ment the already harsh measures in place to block the assets of ter
rorist groups with an influx of charitable aid into the same regions,
to fill the economic gap created by the deprivation of terroristbacked funds. Chakravarty thereby reminds us not to think about
the fight against terrorism purely as a conflict we win on the battle
field but also as a struggle to ameliorate the poverty and local polit
ical instability on which terrorist groups capitalize.
So conceived, Chakravarty’s article presents the precise con
flict at the heart of the Humanitarian Law Project case currently
before the Supreme Court, which raises several constitutional chal
lenges to a 1996 federal statute that prohibits individuals from pro
viding material support to designated “Foreign Terrorist
22. See, e.g., GLENN SULMASY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A
NATURAL EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2009). For a critique of
these proposals, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 505 (2009).
23. Aloke Chakravarty, Feeding Humanity, Starving Terror: The Utility of Aid in a
Comprehensive Antiterrorism Financing Strategy, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 295 (2010).
24. Id. at 297.
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Organizations” (FTOs).25 After several rounds of litigation, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute is unconstitutionally vague
to the extent that it prohibits the provision of “service,” “training,”
or “expert advice or assistance.”26 Specifically, the crux of the
court of appeals’s analysis was that such prohibitions are vague be
cause they may also bar constitutionally protected speech in sup
port of the nonviolent (and specifically peace-building) initiatives of
the two designated FTOs at issue—the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
and the Tamil Tigers.27 And although nothing would stop the fed
eral government itself from providing the types of aid that
Chakravarty proposes in his article, a reversal of the Ninth Circuit
in the Humanitarian Law Project case could well have a chilling
effect on the willingness of private humanitarian groups, especially
those within the United States, to continue to pursue such activities.
Indeed, the government’s view of the statute is so sweeping that it
would even encompass the preparation of an amicus brief on behalf
of an FTO.28
Peter Margulies, too, offers a new way of thinking about issues
with which we have already been grappling, framing the contempo
rary debate over the future of detention policy as a combination of
three factors: efficiency, equity, and accuracy.29 As Margulies puts
it, these factors have as much to say about the differing positions
over where to house current and future detainees as they have to
say about the substantive merits of these cases and the scope of the
government’s detention authority. More than that, though, Margu
lies’s thoughtful analysis draws on examples from everyday cases to
show how, even in the unique context of detaining terrorism sus
pects, we can gain insight from revisiting conventional “siting” con
siderations that we take into account in transporting psychiatric
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
26. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 928-31 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted sub nom. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
Chakravarty himself notes the overlap. See Chakravarty, supra note 23, at 314 n.60
(discussing Humanitarian Law Project).
27. Humanitarian Law Project, 552 F.3d at 928-30. The court rejected a vague
ness challenge to the statutory prohibition on providing “personnel” to FTOs, given
that Congress in 2004 had expressly rewritten the statute to provide a more specific
definition. Id. at 930-31.
28. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 47–48, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro
ject, No. 08-1498 (U.S. argued Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1498.pdf.
29. See Peter Margulies, Putting Guantanamo in the Rear-View Mirror: The Politi
cal Economy of Detention Policy, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 339 (2010).

R
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patients, locating wind farms, and other run-of-the-mill policy
choices.30
As importantly, Margulies reminds us that the detention issue
is, first and foremost, a political problem. Uncertainty still reigns
paramount with regard to whether the Constitution provides non
citizens held outside the United States (and not at Guantanamo)
with a right to pursue habeas relief.31 And even in cases where
such protection is available, the law has done very little to articulate
the specific claims that the writ protects.32 With such a dearth of
legal clarity, it may be a far more effective and realistic conversa
tion to focus on the political factors behind the shaping of detainee
policy, as opposed to our obsession with the legal rules that may or
may not constrain the government’s choices. And we need look no
further for signs of this approach than to the Supreme Court’s
March 2010 decision not to reach the merits of whether the federal
courts have the power to release Uighurs, detained at Guantanamo,
into the United States,33 instead remanding the case to the D.C.
Circuit to consider the changed diplomatic (and political)
circumstances.34
One can find similar themes in the two student notes in this
issue, as well. Thus, Thomas Gray tackles the thorny but critical
issues of contractor liability and immunity, a problem that grows
only that much more important every year as more and more con
ventional military functions are served by private contractors,
even—if not especially—in foreign combat zones.35 Gray proposes
as a solution the adoption of a standard along the lines of the test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies
30. See id. at 343-45.
31. The question is currently raised in sharpest relief in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, the
government’s appeal to the D.C. Circuit of Judge Bates’s ruling that noncitizens not
initially detained in Afghanistan and not citizens of Afghanistan are protected by the
Suspension Clause at Bagram Air Base. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205,
214-26 (D.D.C. 2009).
32. See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 513-16 (D.C. Cir.
2009), cert. denied, No. 09-581, 2010 WL 1005960 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010).
33. See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam),
vacating 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
34. Kiyemba I, 130 S. Ct. at 1235 (“[W]e vacate the judgment and remand the
case to the [D.C.] Circuit. It should determine, in the first instance, what further pro
ceedings in that court or in the District Court are necessary and appropriate for the full
and prompt disposition of the case in light of the new developments.”).
35. See Thomas Gray, Note, I’m Just Following Orders: A Fair Standard of Immu
nity for Military Service Contractors, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 373 (2010).
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Corp.36 In his view, the law should shield contractors from liability
when the injury in question resulted from an order, plan, or direc
tive from the U.S. military; the contractor was not negligent; and
the contractor disclosed to the United States any concerns or poten
tial risks.37 Put somewhat differently, Gray’s note offers an argu
ment to generalize a standard traditionally reserved for contractors
in the products-liability context, in order to account for the unique
national security concerns that arise when contractors are both lit
erally and figuratively on the front lines.
Although Gray is not the first to propose a thorough reconcep
tualization of contractor liability, his discussion, like those offered
by Chakravarty and Margulies, also dovetails with important on
going litigation, especially in the Supreme Court. Thus, the Court is
currently waiting for the views of the Solicitor General as to
whether it should grant certiorari in Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown
& Root Services, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit decision mentioned
above that relied upon the political-question doctrine to bar a zoneof-combat tort claim against a government contractor.38 Moreover,
although the Boyle test on which Gray proposes to rely has been
heavily criticized in some circles,39 it should not be difficult to see
how his multifactor balancing would allow for far more casespecific consideration than the categorical bar to justiciability em
braced by the court of appeals in Carmichael. It would thereby risk
far less distortion than a rule that effectively immunizes any and all
claims arising out of contractor torts overseas.
Last, although Sara Fawk’s note is perhaps the least obvious fit
insofar as the distortion effect of national security considerations in
contemporary jurisprudence, she deftly summarizes the
hypertechnical—and yet quite significant—circuit split that has
arisen over whether lawful permanent residents (LPRs) facing re
moval for pre-1996 convictions may still seek relief under former
section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act if the basis
for their removal was not a basis for exclusion under the pre-1996
36. 487 U.S. 500, 512-13 (1988).
37. See Gray, supra note 35, at 375.
38. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1280
(11th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2009) (No. 09
683).
39. For criticisms of Boyle, see Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Gov
ernment Contractor Defense: Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257
(1991), and Michael D. Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme Court and the Prod
ucts Liability Crisis: Lessons from Boyle’s Government Contractor Defense, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 637 (1990).

R
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framework.40 The issue arises because section 212(c) was itself
styled as providing a “waiver of excludability,” giving rise to the
possibility that such relief would not be available to individuals—
such as LPRs—not subject to exclusion.
At first blush, section 212(c) has little to do with national se
curity concerns, especially given the other national-security related
authorities for either removing noncitizens from the country or, at
the very least, denying to terrorism suspects immigration remedies
that might otherwise be available.41 But the circuit split at the heart
of Fawk’s note is emblematic of the clear and well-documented
anti-immigrant mentality that motivated the Antiterrorism and Ef
fective Death Penalty Act of 199642 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Im
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 199643
(IIRIRA), the latter of which eliminated section 212(c) relief alto
gether. And much of that anti-immigrant mentality behind the
1996 reforms was itself a response to fears of increased security
threats posed by noncitizens, especially in light of the first World
Trade Center bombing in 1993.44
True, the Supreme Court saved at least some of section 212(c)
in INS v. St. Cyr, holding that discretionary relief must still be avail
able for individuals who pleaded guilty to the offenses that ren
dered them removable prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA, lest the
statutes have an impermissible retroactive effect.45 Nevertheless,
the elimination in future cases of such an important case-specific
means of blocking deportation at least in part because of the most
amorphous of national security concerns provides perhaps the be
ginning of our story, rather than the end. And, given both the cir
cuit split that Fawk identifies and an even more pronounced split
over whether St. Cyr also applies when the defendant went to trial
40. See Sara Fawk, Note, Eligibility for Section 212(c) Relief from Deportation: Is
It the Ground or the Offense, the Dancer or the Dance?, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 417
(2010); see also Sarah Koteen Barr, Comment, C is for Confusion: The Tortuous Path of
Section 212(c) Relief in the Deportation Context, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 725 (2008)
(also discussing the circuit split).
41. See, e.g., Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534, 536–38 (7th Cir. 2008).
42. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
43. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
44. Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651, 2010 WL 1222274, at *4–5 (U.S. Mar. 31,
2010) (summarizing the increasing harshness of federal immigration law culminating
with the 1996 revisions). See generally Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The
REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the “Rule” of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
161, 162–63 & n.7 (2006–2007) (summarizing the background and implications of
AEDPA and IIRIRA).
45. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 325-26 (2001).
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as opposed to pleading guilty,46 the odds are strong that section
212(c) will be back before the Court before long.47
***
Justice Cardozo famously warned readers of “the tendency of a
principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.” That is the con
cern here. Although no one can deny that the government has a
compelling interest in protecting us against future acts of terrorism,
it is long-past the time to carefully reflect upon the extent to which
this interest has affected (and will continue to influence) areas of
previously settled doctrine. We may end up deciding that the law is
evolving in exactly the way that it should. We may, instead, con
clude that we’ve made mistakes, overzealously championing exten
sions of precedent that, with the benefit of hindsight, we realize
were neither necessary nor prudent. I leave it to the individual
readers to decide for themselves which is a fairer view of the cur
rent state of affairs. If nothing else, though, each of these four
works of scholarship should help us better to appreciate the many
ways in which this distinction matters.

46. The logic is a bit hard to follow, but it is basically thus: St. Cyr concluded that
noncitizens who faced criminal charges prior to 1996 might have pleaded guilty with the
knowledge that they would still be eligible to apply for section 212(c) relief, relief that
might not have been available had they been convicted at trial. Thus, to apply the
removal of section 212(c) relief to them would be “retroactive.” In contrast, non
citizens who went to trial anyway cannot be said to have made this calculation—that is,
they did not decline to plead guilty strategically in order to preserve their eligibility for
section 212(c) relief. As such, to apply the statute to them would not have an impermis
sible retroactive effect. See, e.g., Kellermann v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700, 705–07 (6th Cir.
2010) (summarizing the issue and noting the large and sharp circuit split).
47. But see Ferguson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 563 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009) (rais
ing the same issue), cert. denied, 2010 WL 757697 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-263).

